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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
DELL D. ARCHULETA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900375-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking defendant's 
probation for convictions of theft, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), and theft by 
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-405 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), 
as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly revoke defendant's 
probation? A trial judge's order revoking probation will be 
upheld absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Jameson, 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah October 22, 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990), and one count of theft by deception, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of 76-6-405 (1990) (Record [hereafter 
R.] at 6). Trial by jury was held on September 18, 1989, in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Pat B. Brian, district judge, presiding (R. at 36). Defendant 
was convicted of both counts (R. at 25-6). On October 6, 1989, 
defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years, and ordered to 
pay a fine in the amount of $10,000.00 and restitution in the 
amount of $77.00 (October 6, 1989 Sentencing Transcript 
[hereafter S.T.] at 5 and R. at 73). Both the sentence and fine 
were stayed and defendant was placed on probation for 18 months 
on the following conditions (S.T. at 5): 
1. Usual and ordinary conditions required by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
2. Serve 90 days in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. The court will give the defendant 
credit for time served, and deem the 90 days 
to have been served as of October 6, 1989. 
3. Pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 at 
the rate of $100.00 per month starting 
January 1, 1990. 
4. Pay restitution in the amount of $77.00 
in full by June 1, 1990. 
5. Obtain employment by October 16, 1989 and 
maintain full-time employment (40 hours per 
week). 
6. Commit no crimes. 
7. Must pay child support in the amount of 
$75.00 per month starting November 1, 1989. 
All child support arrearages must be paid 
within 18 months at a rate of $225.00 per 
month. Total child support payments are 
$300.00 per month. One-half to be paid at 
the first of the month and the other half to 
be paid on the fifteenth of the month. 
8. Evaluated by APPD for drug or alcohol 
abuse and if needed, enter any program deemed 
appropriate by APPD. 
(S.T. at 5-7 and R. at 74 and included as Addendum A). 
On May 22, 1990, the court issued an order to show 
cause based on allegations that defendant had violated the terms 
and conditions of his probation. At the order to show cause 
hearing, the court made the following findings: 
1. The defendant failed to report to Adult 
Probation and Parole in May, 1990. 
2. The defendant failed to maintain 
verifiable, lawful employment and/or 
education. 
3. The defendant failed to pay $100.00 per 
month towards his fine. 
4. The defendant failed to pay a total of 
$300.00 per month towards his child support 
obligation. 
(Order to Show Cause Hearing [hereafter H.T.] at 31-32 and R. at 
95-96 and included as Addendum B). Based on these findings, the 
court revoked defendant's probation and reinstated probation for 
eighteen months after his release from jail upon the following 




1. That all conditions of probation 
previously imposed be in effect. 
2. That he serve six months in jail with 
credit for time served. 
3. That within fifteen calendar days from 
his release from jail, he be employed sixty 
hours per week, and that he provide written 
verification of the same. 
4. That he be enrolled in vocational 
training as soon as possible after his 
release from jail, but no later than ninety 
days from that release; further that any 
costs he pays towards said vocational 
training can be deducted from the fine 
previously imposed. 
(R. at 96; Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are contained in the 
statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly revoked defendant's probation 
because the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
failed to report to his probation supervisor by May 5, 1990; that 
defendant failed to maintain full-time employment; and that 
defendant failed to pay the fines, restitution and child support 
as ordered by the court. 
Defendant did not keep faith with the court or the 
agency which supervised his probation. He therefore willfully 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVOKED DEFENDANT'S 
PROBATION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in revoking 
his probation. He claims that he did not willfully violate his 
probation and alleges that he in fact made good faith efforts to 
abide by the conditions of his probation (Brief of Appellant 
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 8-10). The record however does not 
support defendant's good faith claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (Supp. 1990) states: 
After the hearing the court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the 
defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation 
revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed. 
At the order to show cause hearing on June 20, 1990, the trial 
court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt four 
of the five violations alleged in the affidavit in support of 
order to show cause (H.T. at 31-32 and R. at 80-81). As a result 
of these findings, the trial court revoked defendant's probation. 
However, rather than reinstating defendant's original sentence of 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, at the Utah 
State Prison, the trial court granted 18 months probation and a 
six-month jail sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
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[W]e reaffirm that judges may exercise 
sentencing discretion within those limits 
established by the legislature; the power to 
fix sentencing limits and the power to 
suspend sentence in favor of probation are 
not inherent in the judiciary but must be 
authorized by statute. Similarly, the power 
to revoke probation must be exercised within 
legislatively established limits. 
757 P.2d at 464. Because nothing in the record shows that 
defendant "[kept] faith with the court and the agency which 
supervise[d] his probation,M State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 
1944)), the trial court correctly revoked defendant's probation. 
The trial court's actions were clearly within the legislatively 
established limits of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (Supp. 1990) 
and the order revoking probation should be upheld by this Court. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981), the 
Utah Supreme Court observed that "the decision of a trial court 
to modify or revoke probation is basically a discretionary 
matter." This was reaffirmed in State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (Utah October 22, 1990). Earlier, in Williams v. Harris, 
149 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1944), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
the State's burden required a showing of "some competent 
evidence." Similarly, several jurisdictions have observed that 
the standard of proof required for revocation of probation is 
that the evidence and facts reasonably satisfy the judge that the 
probationer's conduct has not been as required by the conditions 
of probation. See United States v. Guadarrama, 742 F.2d 487 (9th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. O'Quinn, 689 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 
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1982); United States v, Young , dth Cir. 1985i , " 
Other courts have held that " [trial] court requires 2it« !• 
evi deuce to fii id that . tvr <f~r *io- violated his probation 
conditions , " See United States v. Warnei , ll '"" ,v" ''i »> M ( ^  t h C1 r . 
1 9 8 7 ) ; United States v, Torrez-Flores, 624 F.AJ /7t>, /HU-lil i 'th 
CI r ] 980) • • . " . . '• ; " • • 
However, in State v> Hodgeb - uLan 
• Ap' 9 this Court held that "the standaru , ..«= ?ed in 
condition * probatior 
2 
preponderance of the evidence." 
guidance ir meeting the standard: 
Under the preponderance of evidence standard, 
the court needs only to balance the evidence, 
using discretion to weigh its importance and 
credibility, and decide whether the 
probationer has more likely than not violated 
the conditions of probation* 
798 '.za at 
Whe dence -& ihe appropriate 
standard o: / - • ..• *-t. .•
 A.- us- \ ^ und thai uie 
S r- beyond a reasonable doubt to«r rf t ^  fivf 
violations alleged in t or order to show 
o 
Because the panel of this Court in Hodges effectively overr111ed 
the "some competent evidence" standard adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Williams, something the Utah Court of Appeals 
does not appear to have the authority to do, the State has filed 
a petition for writ of certiorari in that case in the Utah 
Supreme Court. However, for purposes of this appeal, the State 
will address defendant's claim under the Hodges preponderance 
standard. The State, nevertheless, maintains that this Court is 
bound to follow the Supreme Court's "some competent evidence" 
standard until the Supreme Court sees fit to abandon it. Indeed, 
this panel is not obligated to follow Hodges on this point, in 
that Hodges is in direct conflict with Williams; this Court could 
review defendant's probation revocation under the "some competent 
evidence" standard. 
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cause (H.T. at 31-32 and R. at 80-81). Because "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" is a higher standard than "preponderance of 
evidence", it is logical to conclude that the evidence presented 
at the revocation hearing established by at least a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant violated the terms of his 
probation. Indeed, the record supports that conclusion. 
Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
revoking defendant's probation. 
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT KEEP FAITH WITH THE 
COURT AND THE AGENCY WHICH SUPERVISED HIS 
PROBATION AND THEREFORE WILLFULLY VIOLATED 
THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION. 
As part of his probation requirements, defendant was to 
report to his probation officer by the fifth of each month and 
fill out a monthly report (H.T. at 7). Defendant took no 
affirmative steps to meet this requirement. Only through the 
efforts of three different probation officers to contact 
defendant and remind him of his obligation were any reports filed 
(H.T. at 4-7). Such spoon feeding was not contemplated by the 
court when it granted the privilege of probation. Simply because 
defendant's probation officers succeeded on a few occasions to 
get defendant to file his monthly report does not mean that they 
now bear the burden and consequences of defendant's failure to 
comply with his probation requirements. Thus, defendant's 
analogy to contract law has no place in this proceeding (Br. of 
App. at 10-15). The court ordered that defendant comply with the 
usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole (R. at 74). One of these ordinary 
conditions requires defendant to report to his supervising agent 
-8-
person - • ? *• month. Defendant consistently 
"f ^ rgot iter a meeting with 
Karl Bartell April in which defendant was givei 1 30 
days 1 req complying v.•r > - probation requirements, 
defenda - -. ••*•* ion and Parole by 
May 5, *??>. --: - ** *-- : Bartell was justified 
in alleging ** -•- , defendant had violated the 
condlt , 
Defendant claims he was serious about being employed 
' -: p. at ±v) ''-~;*' , defendant failed to maintain full-time 
employment as requirec . I>I ihc imlt.T in i hnv rnuse 
hearing the trial court stated: 
The court finds that the State has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt allegation No. 3 in 
the affidavit, in that the defendant violated 
previously granted probation by having failed 
to maintain verifiable, lawful employment. 
This Court will take judicial notice that 
from South Temple to 5300 South on State 
Street, on any given day, there are probably 
15 or 20 help wanted signs posted in 1iving 
color in the windows of business 
establishments. Employment in this community 
can be had, if a person is serious about 
being employed. Compensation may not be more 
than minimum wage. Nevertheless, it i s there 
for a person serious about being employed 
VH r is apparent from this finding that the trial 
cow . • . ed ' • I IP f PIU la ii 1 lie in n i IIIHHH1 reasonable effort 
I,na employment. ;n Bearden v. Georgia, 11 J U.S. 658 (198 : * 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
[A] probationer's failure to make sufficient 
bona fide efforts to seek employment . . . in 
order to pay the fine or restitution may 
reflect an insufficient concern for paying 
the debt he owes to society for his crime. 
In sue* situatior v:e State "s "likewise 
justified in revoking probation and using 
imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for 
the offense, 
461 U.S. at 668. 
The record reflects that defendant had brief full-time 
employment, which he quit, and worked part-time through a 
temporary service (H.T. at 15, 18) This did not comply with the 
order of the court. The probation conditions required defendant 
to work 40 hours a week (R. at 74). Further, the trial judge 
informed defendant that he may need to obtain a second or third 
job in order to pay his debts and comply with his probation 
requirements (S.T. at 7). Because defendant failed to maintain a 
full time job, the court was justified in finding that he was in 
violation of his probation agreement. 
Defendant also claims the court erred in its decision 
to revoke his probation for financial noncompliance (Br. of App. 
at 23). Again in Bearden, the United States Supreme Court held: 
A sentencing court cannot properly revoke a 
defendant's probation for failure to pay a 
fine and make restitution, absent evidence 
and findings that he was somehow responsible 
for the failure or that alternative forms of 
punishment were inadequate to meet the 
State's interest in punishment and 
deterrence. 
Id. at 660. At the same time, however, the Bearden Court 
recognized that "[a] defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him 
from punishment." I_d. at 669. 
The circumstances in this case differ significantly 
from those in Bearden. The Bearden Court, unlike the trial court 
in the case at bar, made no finding that the defendant had not 
made sufficient bona fide efforts to find work. Id, at 673 The 
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defendant in Bearden borrowed money from his parents t~ pav th^ 
f j. it-ii f. illlfj. I'll i I In1 linn ai O O J , Defendant • the present 
case paid nothing toward his fines, restitution 1 
1 
support ' When the defendant in Bearden, who had only a ninth-
grade edut ai J I HI and , was laid off from his job, he 
notified t . probation officer that his payment woul : - e 
because, ait repeated efforts, \r * ^  - anable - : another 
job. IdL ' u n . evidence 1 tnai defendant 
contacted any ; lis probation supervisors to inform them, that he 
v jt De aDjLtr i --e* - ?v financial obligations. His own 
testimony reveals t- report, 
M[he] was always able r-. t ^ j K * t^ei: at-; ,::. « ;ut : personal 
problems tha J - J wd& having" (H. ** • R..: never 
testified that -.v. spoke wi - - » m^tM J nq U I P I m a m ial 
obligations imposed by probation, Finally, the Court in Bearden 
reins La** . sentence upon revoking his 
probatioi -. *h» casf-, 
defendant's probation commence anew pursuan: t *.ah Code Ann. 
§ f'" i i H - J ( M | Su[ 
Defendant claims that he made $20.00 payments to his daughter-s 
mother and that these payments were no different than indirect 
payments submitted to the Di vl sion of Recovery Services (Br. of 
App. at 19-20). At the sentencing hearing, the court addressed 
this issue, stating: "You [defendant] obtain a statement in the 
form of an affidavit from your ex-wife, 1 .hat that money has been 
received in the form of child support, how much, over what period 
of time, and the Court will reconsider the total amount of 
arrearages in light of any documentation you submit, showing 
payment of child support" (S.T. at 8 ) . The record contains no 
such documentation, nor does it indicate that defendant attempted 
to provide the documentation. 
Defendant never denies that he violated his probation 
agreement. He only argues that the violations were not willful. 
Further, although defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
not informing him that it would accept token payments, he never 
asserts that he did not understand what was required of him on 
probation. In fact, the opposite is true. The court questioned 
defendant about his understanding: 
Q. You went into the probation department 
after you were placed on probation by this 
Court, and signed the probation agreement 
dated October 19, 1989, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was really no question in your mind 
as to what your—what you were to do in the 
nine months that passed since that date, was 
there? 
A. No, I knew exactly what I was supposed to 
do, required to do. 
(H.T. at 26). 
Defendant understood what was required of him on 
probation. Yet, he willfully violated the conditions of his 
probation by failing to report by the 5th of each month, failing 
to maintain full-time employment and failing to pay the fines, 
restitution and child support ordered by the court. As a result, 
the trial court properly revoked defendant's probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based c -•- foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Cc the tr. INI ». our I " « decision to revoke 
defendant's probation. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this H day r December, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney Gen* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies ~f 
t ••<r:;---.. et^
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Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, SALT lAKh! LEGAJ UFFENUKhr 
ASSOC, Attorneys fc defendant, 4114 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
S a l t Lak* ti ij,-,iy of December , 1990. 
M ^ 9 ><r rtx^) 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 we would do is be back here on an order to show cause. If he 
2 did pay the fine, it would be taking money from that potential 
3 source. I would ask the Court to reduce the fine, but, rather 
4 than just reduce that as a penalty altogether, to give him 
5 some additional community service in lieu of that. 
6 THE COURT: Anything further? 
7 MS. REMAL: Nothing further, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Is there any legal reason why sentence 
9 should not be imposed? 
10 MS. REMAL: None that I know of. 
11 THE COURT: The defendant has heretofore been 
12 convicted of theft, a second-degree felony. For that offense, 
13 the defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 
14 term prescribed by law, a fine of $10,000 is imposed. The 
15 imposition of that sentence is suspended. The defendant is 
16 placed on probation for 18 months on the following terms and 
17 conditions: One, the defendant serve 90 days in the Salt Lake 
18 County Jail. The Court will give the defendant credit for 
19 time served, and deem the 90 days to have been served as of 
20 October 6, 1989. 
21 The Court imposes a fine of $1,000 plus the 
22 surcharge. That fine is to be paid at $100 a month on the 
23 first day of each month, and the first payment is to commence 
24 January 1, 1989 — 1990. And the fine is to be paid in $100 
25 increments thereafter on the first day of each month until the 
1 fine and the surcharge have been paid. The Court will not 
2 impose community service. 
3 The defendant is ordered to pay restitution. That 
4 amount is to be paid in full on or before June 1, 1990. 
5 The Court orders that the defendant be evaluated for 
6 drug and alcohol abuse, and if treatment is deemed appropriate 
7 by the probation department, that the defendant enter into and 
8 complete any program recommended by Adult Probation and 
9 Parole. 
10 The defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain 
11 full-time employment, with a minimum of 40 hours of work each 
12 week for the entire time the defendant is on probation. 
13 Employment is to commence no later than October 9, 1989. 
14 The defendant is further ordered, as a condition of 
15 probation, to pay child support as ordered in previous court 
16 orders; that is, to pay $75 per month in child support. The 
17 current child support payment is to commence on November 1, 
18 1989, and be paid on the first day of each month thereafter, 
19 with regularity. 
20 The Court further orders that the arrearages, in the 
21 amount of $3,900, be paid in full in the next 18 months. 
22 Those payments are to be made at $225 a month in arrearages. 
23 The $75 a month current child support, for a total payment of 
24 $300 per month in child support. Half that payment is to be 
25 made on the 1st day of each month, and half on the 15th day of 
each month. And the Court insists that that term and 
condition of probation be complied with. 
The recoupment fee is not ordered. 
The defendant is ordered to be law-abiding. 
The defendant needs to understand that should you 
come before this Court on a willful violation of any order 
that represents a term or condition of your probation, you 
will go back to jail. Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You may be required to obtain a second 
job. You may be required to obtain a third job. You better 
get with it. The Court expects that child support and 
arrearages to be paid in full, your current child support to 
be maintained, the fine to be paid, and the restitution to be 
paid. 
THE DEFENDANT: May I say something? 
THE COURT: You may. 
THE DEFENDANT: I have been paying my child support 
to my ex-girlfriend, my daughter's mother, and she was on 
welfare, and I didn't know about it. That's the only reason 
why it is backed up so far. They got ahold of me through my 
sister, and told me all this back money, when all this time I 
had been paying it. 
THE COURT: If you have any verification that child 
support has been paid, which would legally offset the 
7 
Judgment/State v. _/CR ^Honorable 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
EfUsual andjordinanAConditions required by.the Dept. of Adult Probation & Paroley 
, • ^0 9h Dais)- mj/b-L l^ibrrr* Jioyf^ • 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing -77? Uf< l?Jf/?rtr/i -ffPrrnlVfin * 
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1 probation to date. Turn your life around. Get serious about 
2 I this. It appears to the Court that that patience and long 
3 suffering and that sage counsel and advice fell on deaf ears. 
4 The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
5 defendant has violated previously granted probation, in that 
6 the defendant did not submit his monthly reports by the 5th of 
7 the month, as agreed to by the defendant, as set forth in the 
8 allegation No. 1 of the affidavit. 
9 The Court finds that the State did not meet their 
10 burden in allegation No. 2, regarding residence. There is 
11 some confusion about whether or not the defendant lived there, 
12 and whether or not that was a valid residence. The Court is 
13 not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the question of 
14 residence was proved. 
15 The Court finds that the State has proved beyond a 
16 reasonable doubt allegation No. 3 in the affidavit, in that 
17 the defendant violated previously granted probation by having 
18 failed to maintain verifiable, lawful employment. This Court 
19 will take judicial notice that from South Temple to 5300 South 
20 on State Street, on any given day, there are probably 15 or 20 
21 help wanted signs posted in living color in the windows of 
22 business establishments. Employment in this community can be 
23 had, if a person is serious about being employed. 
24 Compensation may not be more than minimum wage. Nevertheless, 
25 it is there for a person serious about being employed. 
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1 I The Court finds that the State has proved beyond a 
2 reasonable doubt allegation No. 4 in the affidavit, in that 
3 the defendant failed to pay the minimum amount set by the 
4 Court of $100 per month toward his fine. There has not been 
5 I one nickel paid on that fine in nine months. Not a penny. 
6 The Court further finds that the State has proved 
7 beyond a reasonable doubt allegation No. 5 in the affidavit in 
8 support of the order to show cause, in that the defendant 
9 failed to make any child support payments toward what is now 
10 in excess of $4,000 in child support arrearages. Payment of 
11 child support is not of recent — nonpayment of child support 
12 is not of recent origin. There is a longstanding, historical 
13 refusal by the defendant to pay child support. And the 
14 records verify that. 
15 The Court finds that the defendant has violated 
16 previously granted probation, granted to this defendant on the 
17 6th of October, 1989. The sole question before the Court now 
18 is whether or not the defendant should be reinstated on the 
19 original terms of probation, with additional terms of 
20 probation added thereto, or whether or not the original prison 
21 sentence handed down and stayed should be imposed. The Court 
22 will hear from counsel. 
23 MR. SK0RDAS: Since Mr. Bartell would be the person 
24 supervising him, could I allow him to address the Court on 
25 that? 
32 
Third JucJiciei District 
LISA J. REMAL, (#2722) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
DELL D. ARCHULETTA, : Case No. 891901028FS 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
Defendant. : 
After having heard the testimony of the witnesses presented 
by the State and by the defendant, and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, 
The Court finds that the defendnat has violated his 
probation as follows: 
1. The defendant failed to report to Adult Probation and 
Parole in May, 1990, as alleged in allegation No. 1 of the Order to 
Show Cause. 
2. The defendant failed to maintain verifiable, lawful 
employment and/or education, as alleged in allegation No. 3 of the 
Order to Show Cause. 
3. The defendant failed to pay $100 per month towards his 
fine, as alleged in allegation No. 4 of the Order to Show Cause. 
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4. The defendant failed to pay a total of $300 per month 
towards his child support obligation/ as alleged in allegation No. 5 
of the Order to Show Cause. 
Based upon those findings, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants probation be 
revoked and reinstated on probation for eighteen (18) months after 
his release from jail upon the following conditions: 
1. That all conditions of probation previously imposed be 
in effect. 
2. That he serve six months in jail with credit for time 
served. 
3. That within fifteen calendar days from his release from 
jail, he be employed sixty hours per week, and that he provide 
written verification of the same. 
4. That he be enrolled in vocational training as soon as 
possible after his release from jail, but no later than ninety days 
from that release; further that any costs he pays towards said 
vocational training can be deducted from the fine previously 
imposed. 
DATED this jG day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT ~&T-ttf 
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